Today and Yesterday

The barren incoherence of conservative propaganda

Anna Ochkina

Translated by Dan Erdman

February 24, 2023 marked a year since the start of what, in Russia, is ordered to be called a special military operation, and what in the rest of the world is considered to be the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Ukraine, this was celebrated as the day of steadfastness, and in Russia as the day of the Great Justification. The propagandists have downplayed the might and main from their speeches of a year ago, in which they assured the swift victory of the Russian army and the immediate fall of the "Nazi regime in Kyiv." Now on Russian television it is said that if President Putin wanted to take Kiev in three days, he could certainly do so, but Russia does not want blood and violence; furthermore the fall of Kiev in three days was promised by the Americans, and not at all by the Russian media. There are no quotes preserved on the Internet to contradict this: there was no such thing, and that's it. That wasn't us.

Today's Russian propaganda is desperately false, incoherent to the point of schizophrenia. Kremlin propagandists are chillingly inhuman and at the same time so ridiculous that one may begin to think...maybe this is the trick? Maybe that's how it was intended? It is easier for the mind to see a cunning plan, a conspiracy, betrayal, or even the work of mystic forces than to recognize the possibility of a dictatorship of total stupidity.

The Russian propagandists' idiocy and amateurism are not surprising, and really quite understandable. In recent years, becoming an influential and wealthy journalist in the state media, especially on television, was possible only with a complete absence of reflection, honesty and critical thinking. As one of my professors at the university used to say: “critical thinking” is a tautology; if you are not critical, you're not thinking at all, but simply repeating other people’s words, something a parrot can do just as well.

But it's not only stupidity. Propaganda essentially has nothing to say, and so must shout, its pathetic and aggressive form masking its blank content.

About ten years ago, Russian ruling circles began actively looking for a new ideology, a national idea. Orders rained down on universities and research teams, and think tanks were created in batches. But no ideology was forthcoming. Of course, they came up with some words on a page, but nothing that could function as a real national idea, an idea that people would devote themselves to both consciously and recklessly, one that wouldn't have to be driven by force, one that was more than a beautiful description in an application for a delicious presidential grant.

I am sure that there are many talented people in Russia who are able to generate good ideas. Not only could, but have - there are many interesting channels on the Russian Internet created by smart people, including those who for a long time believed that the system could be redone gradually, that there are still rational, progressive, democratic, and humane options for the development of the country. But such options do not suit the authorities, and these projects were sent to the wastebasket. The Russian government, however, has no competing ideology, it does not want and does not need anything like that, but simply wants to exploit the country and live happily ever after. The only need for an ideology is to cover up theft and exploitation.

I think that the authorities constantly overestimate the protest potential of their own people. The elites periodically saw and probably continue to see rebellion in their nightmares, the same "senseless and merciless" Russian rebellion. This phrase of Alexander Pushkin, the sun of our poetry, is known to every Russian, even the most ignorant.

The Russian rebellion, however, did not happen in the 1990s, when it was predicted by all and sundry. It did not start even after the retirement age was raised, after the facts of election fraud were revealed and these systematic violations of social obligations were firmly endorsed by the president. So far, nothing seems to portend any rebellion. Of course, it's only natural for history to sometimes happen out of the blue. But the Russian elites are hardly familiar with the dialectics of the historical process. Their fear is nothing but their guilt before their own people, in another guise. When the conscience atrophies, it is replaced by fear. The authorities know something so vile about themselves that the people do not know, and so they fear them more than hate them. Therefore, the ruling circles are trying to build something like an ideological straitjacket for their citizens.

It is absolutely logical that the pro-government ideologists chose conservatism. Firstly, this is the only openly anti-egalitarian ideology, secondly, conservatism is inherently opposed to change, as are the Russian elites, and thirdly, a conservative cannot promise anything but an eternal Yesterday. You can say a lot of beautiful words, remember the heroes and achievements of bygone times, endlessly extol the greatness of the past, and do absolutely nothing for the greatness of the present.

Back in 2011, Vladimir Ivanovich Dobrenkov, professor at Moscow State University, published in a leading sociological publication a huge, 53-page article entitled Conservatism is the National Ideology of Russia. In his article, Vladimir Ivanovich speaks with exceptional frankness about the discrepancy between the aspirations for freedom, independence, and equality with the primordial national values ​​of modern Russia. True, Dobrenkov explained that this was a liberal, Western European version of freedom, but it was quite clear from the text that the professor considered any freedom an unacceptable and dangerous whim. Dobrenkov began his opus with a detailed analysis of a well-known phrase by Count Sergei Semenovich Uvarov - Minister of Education during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I, known for his conservative, even reactionary views - in which he describes the formula of Russian statehood: “Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationality;" this is known as the "triad of Count Uvarov." Dobrenkov does his best to prove in his article that this formula is organic to Russian history and the moral character of the Russian people. He describes the European Parliament as a collection of greedy and corrupt businessmen, and glorifies the true nationality and philanthropy of a strong and centralized state power, paternally caring for the people.

I cannot fail to note that Vladimir Dobrenkov is an active supporter of the death penalty, and has repeatedly spoken out sharply against sexual minorities. In addition, he was accused of plagiarism, of xenophobia, and of being responsible for the collapse of sociological education at Moscow State University. Some are accused, while some others are awarded degrees, titles and positions.

Dobrenkov's article did not create any furor, but it certainly pierced the hearts of several workers on the ideological front in the presidential administration of Russia. Conservative ideology has begun to be actively pressed upon Russian society. Historical films portray uprisings and revolutions as terrible national disasters, and revolutionaries are presented either as fiends, devoid of all human feelings, or as corrupt, unscrupulous grabbers. Any disagreement feeds rebelliousness, any rebelliousness leads to rebellion, any rebellion is rampant lawlessness, deprivation and disaster for many and fabulous profits for the elite - this is the message found in many Russian films and series on historical topics.

Count Uvarov would be pleasantly surprised to know how tenderly the heirs of revolutionaries and subversives treat his ideas. Here is a very recent statement, dated February 27, 2023, by the former Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation - now an assistant to the President of Russia - Vladimir Medinsky: “Uvarov saw prospects for Russia in the East. By the way, he was one of the first who spoke about the coming decline of Europe, said that European civilization is reaching a dead end. For the sake of its development Russia should first seek its interests, focusing on the East, towards China, Central Asia, India, Japan and other countries. Back then these ideas of Uvarov sounded very strange, but now they are interesting and relevant.” In a discussion on his channel, Medinsky gave an appreciation of Count Uvarov's career as Minister of Education. His interlocutor, candidate of historical sciences Sergei Rybakov, fully agreed with this and noted that “in developing his his famous ideological triad 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality,' Uvarov could take into account the ideas of contemporary European philosophers - this of course gives no reason to doubt his authorship - many ideas, as they say, were in the air - one of these things is the legacy of the Great French Revolution, and another, completely different thing - in the words of Blok- is the 'gloomy Teutonic genius.'" Rybakov also spoke very positively about the Uvarov triad, emphasizing that this theory reflects the national character of the Russian people, who, without hesitation, would go to die for their homeland if such a need arose.

This is how conservatism is presented as a truly patriotic - perhaps even the only truly patriotic - ideology. But today, to have only one straitjacket for public sentiment is not enough for the elites, they need an idea that makes anyone who disagrees with the Kremlin's war not just an oppositionist or a foreign agent, but a traitor to the Motherland, not just in the eyes of an obedient and completely dependent Russian court but in the eyes of millions of Russian citizens .

Kremlin circles have long been engaged in the extermination of any political activity in the country. Before February 24, 2022, the political field was cleared consistently and in an organized manner, the repressions were targeted and concerned mainly the most visible and obstinate political players. In the last year, however, the shooting at those who disagree has become much more intense and has acquired a stochastic character. They imprison activists, bloggers, municipal deputies, they fine and detain anyone for an anti-war slogan, drawing, or any “suspicious” public action, up to the performance of famous Soviet pacifist songs. Passive and apolitical Russian society has reacted to the dispersal of rallies and unjust persecution in exactly the same way as an oyster reacts to any danger: it hides even deeper into the shell of private life.

It all started, by the way, quite innocently at first, with the propaganda of traditional family values, which was very positively received by many Russians. Love for the family and, of course, especially for children, is the only common idea in our divided society. But even this is a common idea that divides rather than unites, as it is only love for one's own children that is extolled.

In general, it is not clear what there even is to preserve in Russia. None of the Russian citizens are familiar or close to the Russian Empire; if someone pines for a lost past, then this past is Soviet. That society's achievements, by the way, are also vigorously appropriated by the current government, categorically rejecting and condemning the revolutionary impulse and progressive ideas that inspired these them in the first place.

Russian citizens can talk with great emotion about truly Russian traditions, and can be afraid of the “homosexual plague” and aggression from the insidious West. In their daily lives, in their needs and personal ambitions, they are much closer to Westerners than to some vague conservative ideal. And there is much more European modernity in Russian everyday life than there is Eastern patriarchy. Most Russian women are employed in social production, in most Russian families there are one or two children, to whom parents strive to give the best education available, to provide the child with an iPhone and a computer, and, if possible, to take them abroad. These families also help adult children with housing - young Russians rarely want to live with their parents.

Both mothers and fathers encourage the career aspirations and ambitions of their daughters as well as their sons, though they will also claim, however, that “the main thing for a woman is the family.” Russian society has long been urban; 75% of the population is engaged in non-agricultural labor. The structure of consumption of the average Russian is almost the same as that of the average Westerner, adjusted for the difference in income, of course. Russians are not on track to make themselves in to conservatives, no matter what they may think of themselves. Conservatism is not for individualists who will lay down their lives for the welfare of their own family. And in general, what are the traditional values of a country where the president’s divorce was met not only calmly, but almost with approval?

Yes, Russians are not ready to fight for freedom and democracy, but this does not mean at all that they are ready to give up the benefits, conveniences and liberties of modernity. Political passivity is still not equal to complete humility, and the growth of love for patriotic slogans and imperial symbols is still not equal to the readiness of Russians to die for Orthodoxy and autocracy.

But today, the Russian authorities no longer need peaceful fathers and mothers, but loyal soldiers and a submissive civilian population, ready for any hardships in the name of "the greatness of the country." Propaganda uses homophobia as a connection with ready-made “family values.” Kremlin media trumpet about the danger of the spread of non-traditional sexual practices that threaten the primordial Russian values. “We must fight so that our children have a mother and father, and not Parent One and Parent Two,” is the most popular propaganda slogan today. Experts and presenters on endless television political shows never tire of scaring the Russian layman with sexual perversions that come at us from the insidious and depraved West.

And it is working. In the latest Feedback poll, 45% of Russians were in favor of lifting the moratorium on the death penalty that has been in place in Russia since 1997. When asked what crimes one should be executed for, the majority named pedophilia. Respondents named this crime much more often than murder or even terrorism. By the way, a very popular topic on Russian television is the alleged ongoing legalization of pedophilia in Western countries. Yes, and military operations in Ukraine are supported, according to various estimates, by 50-70 percent of Russians. At least, such is the data of opinion polls.

The trouble with both propaganda and conservative ideology in Russia is that it has the power to stupefy, fool and confuse, but rarely can convince, mobilize, or inspire. Patriotic frenzy is a not only weak but vile substitute for patriotism. Conservatism and traditional values are not capable of stabilizing anything, much less of creating positive models of behavior. Under the guise of traditional values, Russians are simply being intimidated and embittered. They are implicitly told that there are such values and goals for the sake of which it is not only possible, but also necessary to break both the law and morality. And what these values are, you may trust our supreme leader to know.

Such is the specific conservatism of the catastrophe among our elites.

The Russian government does not and cannot have a coherent and consistent ideology, so it has no ideas for the future of the country, no development strategy. The whole point of the Russian elite is to protect themselves and their wealth from any social changes.

Russian propaganda is screaming so that no one will notice how shamelessly and helplessly it lies. But to overwhelm does not mean to convince, and sooner or later reality will turn out to be louder and more insistent than the noisiest propagandists. Then the country will realize that it has been fooled, and it will feel the discomfort of an ideological vacuum.

What and who will fill this vacuum - this is a very important question, the answer to which is not yet available to us. It needs to be found, and only the real opposition can do it. Yes, it is weak today, it is almost in a coma. And yet, the surviving, divided and confused Russian opposition needs to stop complaining about the passivity of the population and accusing all Russians of bloodthirstiness and imperial ambitions; it's time to stop looking for “good Russians” and to begin the argument about the collective guilt of the people. Stop whining and start taking action. Ideas, real ideas, come from real struggles.