The Revolution That Wasn't

Why it began, why it stopped

Anatoly Nesmiyan

Any mercenary always solves commercial problems. Political objectives appear as complements to commercial ones. This is the first and only rule.

Mercenary riots occurred frequently in late feudal Europe and still frequently occur in Africa, but this is something new for Russia. The march on Moscow, organized by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Wagner Private Military Company, is surprising not only by the ease with which his fighters approached the capital, almost without resistance, but also by how easily and abruptly the rebellion was canceled by its own organizers. However, all this seems strange only if we look at what is happening from the point of view of politics; if we understand that the point here is in commerce, then everything will fall into place.

Prigozhin quite confidently controls a position in both the Central African Republic and Syria. However, after the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation decided to set up a military base in this country with the cooperation of the leadership of the CAR, the interests of Wagner were threatened there. What exactly Wagner is guarding in the CAR is unknown, but most likely there are some assets of the “Russian ODESSA” project, a program to evacuate top officials in the event of the collapse of the regime. Simply put, Prigozhin and Wagner are hired to guard stolen treasure.

Establishment of a base by the Ministry of Defense represented a threat of losing this contract, so Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov put themselves in a position in which either they or Prigozhin could remain.

The second threat was the decision to subordinate the Wagner to the Ministry of Defense, which was supposed to happen before July 1.

The commercial objective of the rebellion was to knock out Shoigu and Gerasimov, to eliminate them as threats to the existing position of Wagner, which is as a monopolist in the market of exclusive contracts with the highest Russian nobility. In a sense, Prigozhin should have been supported by other higher clans, who were completely uninterested in the possible strengthening of the Shoigu group should it could gain access to the “Russian ODESSA.” It is unlikely that this support would have been explicit, but indirect; the military and the police literally boycotted the entire march on Moscow, throwing the problem onto the regional governors - no one in their position would appear on any evacuation lists, which means they are valued even less than are officials of the Central African Republic.

In general, Prigozhin achieved his goals through the organization of a political event, which, of course, was a rebellion. But the underlying reason is pure commerce. And as soon as satisfactory guarantees were received that he would remain the only provider of exclusive services, the purpose of the rebellion disappeared.

But what if they hadn't agreed? Would Prigozhin have entered Moscow? Of course, if he had not received a guarantee. The problem is that he could take it - and then a local task could turn into a global problem. The authorities would really have run away, there is no particular doubt about that. And then what? Prigozhin cannot declare himself the owner of the protected property - then all the ex-owners left outside would unite against him. And why does he need power when he has such a fantastically advantageous position?

So, I think he himself breathed a sigh of relief when he managed to reach an agreement before getting to the point where the rats would begin to scatter in droves. And if at the same time they had killed the regime's “outstanding geostrategist,” that would be even worse. With whom will he sign a contract then?

Prigozhin really was very lucky that he did not have time to reach Moscow, since he would have definitely taken it. All these Potemkin checkpoints and barriers, hastily built on the way, turned out to be a problem only for the civilian population, which got stuck on the roads. These not only did not stop the Wagner columns, but he did not even notice them. Literally in one case, the Wagner convoy pushed a couple of Kamaz trucks that blocked the path, and in the meantime shot down either seven or eight helicopters and a plane flying past.

(But by the way, not everything is clear about these incidents either - it's very possible some were knocked out accidentally by one of “our own.”)

In general, if Prigozhin came to Moscow, he would take it, after which a completely different situation would arise - what to do with it and why does he need it? At the same time, not even the entire Wagner was headed to Moscow, but about four or five thousand of them. The Russian army, which was the second-best in the world a year ago, quickly became the second-best army in Ukraine, and now it has won an honorable second place also within Russia, losing first place in points to Wagner.

It is surprising that Prigozhin did not receive his second star of the Hero of the Russian Federation yesterday by Putin's decree - this would be the logical conclusion to all events. So quickly within a day from a patriot to a terrorist, and then back again a patriot; perhaps no one has managed to do it before.

None of this does anything to resolve the fundamental contradictions that exist in the system itself - the lack of social mobility, in the first place, even for those jockeying for position within the system itself. Otherwise, Prigozhin would long ago have been in the highest caste (with his talents) and could solve his problems not through armed rebellion, but through negotiations. But it is no good - he is a hired worker, and therefore he is not spoken to but given orders. At least he, most likely, has now managed to raise his status to some higher one.

But all the rest remains in a frozen position. The contradiction remains, which means that the system remains unstable.

The Russian regime, having exhaled from yesterday's horror, will now pretend that everything is going according to plan and nothing special has happened. It, in general, has nowhere to go, since the conclusions, of course, are extremely disappointing.

Yesterday we witnessed a spasm of near-agony, but it passed during a short stage of clinical death, after which the dying patient nevertheless woke up and resumed his former vegetative existence.

In general, the agony of the regime is going quite according to the plot, no special deviations have observed. The government is incapable of doing anything, even terror. As soon as it encounters real terrorists who know how to use violence, it immediately falls apart and scatters. Its capabilities and abilities are only enough for the unarmed and defenseless.

Putin unusually quickly reacted to the situation, but he would have been better off hiding in his basement, because in the morning he declared everyone to be rebels and traitors, and in the evening it was announced that negotiations were in full swing with these same rebels and traitors. Which is it? Either they are traitors, or a party to the negotiations.

Turmoil, panic and confusion, plus a general flight - that's all that the vast majority of the highest nobles managed to demonstrate. The army authorities who had stirred up the mess disappeared from sight altogether, as if they never existed. The propagandists, constantly frightening their adversaries with nuclear weapons, suddenly disappeared as well. The trash of the second echelons, who only yesterday exhibited photos of themselves with donated sledgehammers, spent all day yesterday deleting them from their Instagrams. As well, the Chechen Sonderkommando, hurrying to Rostov to punish the traitors, prudently found himself in a traffic jam until everything resolved.

Meanwhile, in Rostov yesterday a mass survey among the population spontaneously took place. And it turned out that now 80 percent of those who trusted President Putin could be found among the population of Rostov. And this just as the big boss was on television and angrily calling the apostates traitors.

On the contrary, the day before the people of Rostov had happily fraternized, took pictures and posed in the background, had intimate conversations and ran to shake hands with Prigozhin, who was leaving in the car.

No one went out to stop the tanks - in general, the change of power in the minds of the people occurred literally instantly. I think that if Prigozhin had taken Moscow, he could easily have gathered a rally in Luzhniki on the theme “Let's support the hope of Russia!”

So opinion poll data should be treated with the same credibility that they deserve - that is, with zero.

The phrase "What, so it was possible?" describes what is happening best. It turns out that everything is solved very simply - even without formal apologies. They went to overthrow the frightened commander-in-chief, but then they decided that it was okay, let him live. And that's it.

Of course, we can assume that the government will try to learn from what happened. But this assumption is wrong: the system is on its last legs; this is what the rebellion demonstrated. The regime cannot take risks - it is not able to reform itself, as this will finally destroy the remnants of even the illusory balance in which it resides.

In order to engage in self-reform, the system must have resources sufficient both to carry out reforms and to maintain stability in their implementation.

But that's the problem, that for a long time there are no resources for anything - only for the imitation of stability. If you take out at least a pebble now, everything will fall. Therefore, the main motive for the actions and decisions of the authorities now is the well-known principle: “If something works, don’t touch it!”

A system in a state of catastrophe is unreformable from within, even theoretically - it does not have any resources for this. Changes to the system are only possible from the outside through external management. The only other option is its collapse and the assembly of a new system by other managers from the wreckage and remnants of the previous one. There are no other scenarios, and now there cannot be.

It was announced that although forgiveness and amnesty for yesterday’s outrages apply to Prigozhin himself and his “Wagner” friends, and that the pistols, money, documents and white powder seized in Prigozhin’s office will be returned safe and sound with apologies. But the authorities will definitely look through all the social networks of his supporters in search of subjects relating to extremism and appeals. And of course everyone will be found and punished. War is war, and repression against the population is sacred. There are no changes here.

Anatoly Nesmiyan is the author of the website “Rabkor,” and a political analyst living in Russia. Nesmian's channel in Telegram

Translated by Dan Erdman